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Introduction 
 The Anonynmous Face of Scottish Kingship 
 
‘On account of sin, disaster comes in’.   





Just after daybreak on Tuesday 17
th
 October 1346 a sizeable Scottish armed force was 
foraging for victuals on the church manors of Ferryhill and Merrington eight miles to the 
south of the rich English cathedral town of Durham. According to Jean Froissart, the late 
fourteenth-century Hainault traveller and chronicler of courtly Europe, this body 
numbered about five hundred men - probably a handful of Scots knights and men-at-arms 
mounted on purpose-bred warhorses (or ‘runcies’), the rest highly experienced peasant 
footmen some of whom would be accustomed to riding stocky hackney or ‘hobelar’ 
ponies until a battle was engaged. The leader of this contingent was Sir William Douglas, 
the famed ‘knight of Liddesdale’. He had made his warrior’s reputation and an enviable 
landed fortune over the previous decade by recovering Scottish castles and territory in the 
border marches from English occupation, and in tournaments to-the-death against English 
knights organised during truces.2 But for the past three weeks in autumn 1346 Douglas’s 
battle-hardened company had formed part of a much larger army of at least ten thousand 
men, the first national host led across the border into England by a Scottish king for 
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almost twenty years. This force had penetrated Cumberland and then Northumberland to 
raid and plunder towns, farms and churchlands to maximum effect while Edward III and 
most of his nobles were absent on the continent fighting Scotland’s ally, Philip VI, the 
first Valois king of France.  
Yet despite the easy pickings, there was palpable tension within this Scottish 
army. Several of Scotland’s young and ambitious nobles - including Douglas - men who 
had fought hard to win their own lands and followings over the past two decades, had 
recently clashed with their 21-year-old monarch, David II, son of Robert Bruce. One lord, 
William, earl of Ross, had even slaughtered a local rival, Ranald MacRuaridh of 
Garmoran, favoured in his stead in the north-west of the kingdom by the crown over the 
last five years, while he lay asleep near Perth at the muster for the Scots’ campaign. Ross 
and his men had then deserted the king’s service.3 But, far worse, long before the 
campaign of 1346 King David had also found a myriad of reasons to distrust and actively 
antagonise his half-nephew and the heir apparent to his throne, Robert, the twenty-nine-
year-old Steward of Scotland, the greatest Scottish noble landowner of his day. After only 
a short period of adult rule it was painfully obvious that David did not want Robert 
Steward to succeed him or to add to the vast Stewart territorial holdings in western and 
central Scotland.4  
In spite of this ill-feeling, however, David must have felt firmly in command of a 
host which had been gifted a lucrative free rein to devastate England’s northern frontier. 
The continued success of this leisurely mounted raid or chevauchée – perhaps with the 
fitting climax of reducing an English castle or walled town - would fulfill David’s debt 
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and treaty obligations to King Philip, who had given him vital refuge in France between 
1334 and 1341 following England’s renewed invasion of Scotland. But far more 
importantly, David must have hoped that the 1346 campaign would also cement his 
assertion of his personal authority over those of his more headstrong subjects who had 
exploited his turbulent childhood on the throne (1329-41) for their own gain. Nobles like 
Douglas certainly seemed prepared to support the king in what promised to be a profitable 
and patriotic excursion: the Steward was at least in attendance in command of one of the 
Scots’ three battalions. Here was the perfect chance for David to prove himself his 
father’s son. 
But in the end, this venture produced almost completely the opposite results to 
those to which David had aspired. For without warning on the morning of the 17
th
, 
Douglas’s foraging party was disturbed by the vanguard of an English army of roughly six 
to eight thousand men led by the Archbishop of York and several northern lords, 
including Sir Ralph Neville, Sir Henry Percy and the heir to the Scottish dynasty usurped 
by the Bruces, Edward Balliol, son of John I of Scotland (1292-6). A veteran and victor 
of many skirmishes with smaller English forces, Douglas turned his men and withdrew at 
best speed for the Scottish royal host encamped some seven miles to the north on the 
Beaurepaire (Bearpark) of the bishopric of Durham. According to the contemporary 
chronicler of the nearby priory of Lanercost, a house sacked by the Scots during the same 
campaign: 
William then returned to the Scottish army, hot and shouting very 
vigorously, ‘David! Rise quickly; look, all the English are attacking us’. 
David replied that this was not possible, saying, ‘There are none in 
England but wretched monks, disreputable priests, swineheards, cobblers 
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and skinners; they dare not face me, I am safe enough;’ but they did face 
him, and as was clear afterwards, they were only gently testing him. 
‘Certainly,’ said William, ‘O dread king, saving your peace you will find 
otherwise…’5 
Thus David II was roused rudely from sleep, either in his grand tented pavilion or the 
bishop’s manor house within the Bearpark, and plunged into what would turn out to be 
his first and last pitched battle. It was also to prove the defining moment of his long and 
difficult reign. 
David’s character was such that in spite of this surprise encounter he must have 
remained – not unreasonably - confident of victory as the early morning moisture cleared 
and the rival hosts manoeuvred to face each other across a narrow area of the parkland, 
broken with hillocks, gullies and stone, to the west and within sight of the cathedral tower 
and castle of Durham. Since his return from childhood exile in France just over five years 
previously David had applied himself to winning the affection and loyal following of 
most of his subjects as their leader in war. This had been no easy task. While he had 
grown to adolescence in safety in a quiet corner of Normandy, the Scots had succeeded in 
stalling and gradually winding back the occupation forces of Edward III of England 
(1327-77) and his vassal pretender to the Scottish throne, Edward Balliol. Since the 
summer of 1332 these allies had sought to recover by force the control over the Scottish 
realm seized by Edward I (1272-1307) and briefly held by King John respectively. 
Indeed, in 1332 Edward Balliol’s small force alone, and then in 1333 a much larger 
English royal army, had succeeded in inflicting two calamitous defeats upon the Scots at 
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Dupplin and Halidon Hill and in occupying most of the southern and central shires of the 
kingdom. Balliol had been crowned king of Scotland at Scone in September 1332 within 
a few weeks of his initial invasion, just ten months after David II’s own coronation.6  
Balliol’s ultimate success would have obliterated the memory of what the English 
monarch had denounced as the ‘cowardly’ peace of 1328 which David’s father had 
dictated to the weak, unpopular minority English regime which had dethroned and 
murdered Edward II (1307-27): the Bruce dynasty would thus have lasted only three 
decades. But the Bruce Scots were preserved and aided in their struggle by Edward III’s 
obsession with over-running France, a goal he actively pursued after 1337. Such was the 
degree of Edward’s distraction and the dogged, grinding success of the military efforts of 
the Scots – led by men like Douglas, Ross, Steward and others - that there was really only 
a fringe of Scottish border territory and a few castles left for David to recover personally 
to his rule after his return home in June 1341.  
Nonetheless, David’s undoubted youthful vigour and his generous patronage to 
his warlike subjects won him the backing of by far the majority of his substantial subjects 
during the first five years of his adult rule. Abbot Bower of Inchcolm isle in the Forth, 
writing a century later, trumpeted the host which David assembled under his banner to 
invade northern England in late September 1346 as evidence that the king was ‘fully 
reassured and supported by the knightly young men of military age’.7 Probably some eight 
to twelve thousand Scots – two to three thousand of them at least mounted in some 
fashion – assembled for this campaign. They had come from all quarters of the Scottish 
kingdom, including a few from those regions only loosly controlled by the crown, the 
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outlying west and far north. Their muster was prompted by David’s favourable response 
to the French king’s letters pleading for a diversionary Scottish invasion while Edward III 
was in France and England’s northern counties were – as Philip VI put it - left as a 
‘defenceless void’.8 
However, the bloody Scottish defeat in the unexpected battle which ensued 
outside Durham brought home more than the cold reality of continued Scottish 
vulnerability against superior English archery, infantry and cavalry. Two entire divisions 
of the larger Scottish army were destroyed; most of David’s closest magnate councillors 
were slain; and the king himself suffered two grave arrow wounds to the face before his 
ignominious capture at the hands of a mere English esquire. This threatened to undo in 
the space of just a few hours all that had been achieved over three hard decades by Robert 
I and his generation for the establishment of Scottish independence and a Bruce dynasty, 
as well as all the Bruce Scots had fought to recover in the 1330s. The English defeat at 
Bannockburn in 1314 was avenged in spades. 
Yet this lost battle also deepened the cracks in the Scottish political community. 
For the cruel reality was that David’s army had been further deserted and fatally 
weakened in its moment of need by those disgruntled Scottish magnates whom the young 
king had undermined since 1341 for their apparently self-serving actions during his 
childhood. This fatal withdrawal was headed by the leading magnate and royal heir 
presumptive, Robert Steward, and others like Patrick Dunbar, ninth earl of March. In 
doing so, the Steward must have hoped he was returning home to be king after the death 
of his younger half-uncle, David, in battle.
9
 But as he lay captive, recovering from his 
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wounds, David’s mind must only have become embittered and chrystalised as to the need 
to strangle and break the Steward’s territorial and political influence in fourteenth-century 
Scotland. This would be the king’s paramount domestic goal for the rest of his reign. 
However, for David, undermining the Steward – and his magnate co-deserters – 
would be insepearable from the other major consequence of his capture on that fateful 
day. To secure favourable release terms and to perpetuate English recognition of an 
independent Scotland and a Bruce king, David would have to strike a peace deal with 
Edward III. This time England could dictate the terms. After an excruciatingly frustrating 
eleven years of captivity – during which the Steward as heir to the throne dominated the 
government of Scotland – David was lucky to finally secure his release in return for a ten-
year Anglo-Scottish truce and a ransom of 100,000 merks (£66,666 13s 4d) in late 1357. 
But despite this grave burden David also found hope in his relations with Edward III, a 
monarch and brother-in-law he grew to admire. On several subsequent occasions David 
would return to London to try to mitigate his ransom burden by seeking a full peace treaty 
which would recognise either Edward III or one of his six sons as heir presumptive to the 
Scottish kingship: this would have displaced the claim as next in line to Scotland’s throne 
of Robert Steward and his several sons. In David’s eyes such a re-arrangement became all 
the more vital the longer he ruled without producing his own Bruce offspring. Crucially, 
this was something he seemed physically incapable of doing despite two wives and 
several mistresses. But David would still be preoccupied with siring an heir, securing a 
cheaper peace with England, altering the Scottish succession or otherwise reducing 
Stewart power at the time of his premature death from an unexplained illness on 22 
February 1371. He would be just forty-seven years old.  
 8 
Thus what would prove to be one of longest reigns of the independent Scottish 
kingdom came to an early, quiet, almost anti-climatic end and the second Bruce king’s 
memory and plans were swept aside by the new Stewart dynasty as Robert the Steward 
succeeded as Robert II (1371-90).
10
 David’s rule had been marked by important and 
dramatic developments in the exercise of royal power and government in Scotland and in 
Anglo-Scottish relations: as we shall see, Scottish chivalric culture had also flourished. 
Yet despite these achievements, modern historians have until recently preferred to focus 
on David’s very apparent failings, most of which were exposed by or sprang from the 
compromising events of 17 October 1346. As a result, David has received an 
overwhelmingly negative press. 
Lord Hailes and other nineteenth- and early twentieth-century writers concentrated 
on the ‘dark and drublie’ shortcomings of David’s reign: his seven year exile as a child; 
his disastrous generalship and capture in 1346; his seemingly traitorous ideas for an 
English succession in Scotland; his subsequently sour and vindictive relations with his 
great nobles; his inability to father a son and his estrangement from his first wife, Edward 
III’s sister, Joan of the Tower (d. 1362), and his second, Margaret Logie, a divorce from 
whom David’s regime botched in 1368-9. Thus Victorian and Edwardian historians 
almost inevitably rounded on David for failing to live up to the high morals and 
achievements of his patriotic predecessor: David was ‘weak and capricious, violent in his 
resentments, and habitually under the dominion of women…he degenerated from the 
magnanimity of his father…[to] the allurements of present ease [and]…base 
jealousy…[and] was willing to surrender the honour, security and independence of that 
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people whom God and his laws had intrusted to his protection’. ‘Incompetent’, 
‘unpatriotic’, ‘recreant’, ‘pleasure-seeking’ and ‘worthless’ were further epithets thrown 
at the childless second Bruce king by writers who preferred to pass on to the accession of 
the Stewarts11: and for these critics, condemnation of David’s ‘unbecoming’ adultery was 
certainly to be found in near contemporary chronicle histories like that of Abbot Bower 
writing in the 1440s.12 This was an intemperate king who needed to be contained by a 
responsible political community. Taking this lead, modern parliamentary historian Sir 
Robert Rait even went so far as to assert that David’s rule had thus been one marked by 
‘baronial rule over a weak monarch’ in which the magnate leaders of the political 
community made an ‘honest effort’ to prevent David’s ‘extravagence, weakness and 
indifference’ from wasting revenues raised for administrative purposes and to pay his 
ransom after 1357. Overall, David was certainly not a man to celebrate in popular 
biographical volumes of Eminent Scotsmen: in the celebrated frieze of famous Scots 
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painted for the Scottish National Portrait Gallery by William Brassey Hole (1867-1917), 
David is depicted as a child, protected by Robert I’s followers, his two awkward periods 
of adult rule ignored.
13
 
 This condemnation of the mature David persisted into the twentieth-century. As 
late as 1954, David II was still being bashed in a Historical Association pamphlet by a 
historian who had earlier found virtue in studying the career of James I (1406-37), who 
could be viewed as a masterful ‘lawgiver’ king of Scots (and Bower’s employer) who was 
also a long-time captive of the English crown. E.W.M. Balfour-Melville took care to 
outline David’s difficult inheritence as a five-year-old child in a time of renewed war and 
he looked in more detail than hitherto at the complex diplomacy and internal tensions of 
his adult kingship. But David still emerged in this short study as an inadequate figure in 
one of ‘the most dismal reigns…as calamitous a contrast to his father as Edward II to 
his…through him [David] his country’s hard-won freedom would again be threatened’.14 
As late as 1965, Geoffrey Barrow, in his classic study of Robert I and the political 
community, echoed this bitter regret by remarking that ‘it would have been better for 
Scotland if David Bruce, who was born too late (5 March 1324), had never been born at 
all…the disasters of David II’s minority, exceeded only by the disasters of his maturity, 
might conceivably have been mitigated if not wholly avoided’ and adult Stewart kingship 
ushered in forty years earlier.
15
 Such historical disappointment was still surely influenced 
                                                          
13
 R. Chambers, A biographical dictionary of eminent Scotsmen (5 volumes, Glasgow 1855); R.S. Rait, The 
Parliaments of Scotland (Glasgow 1924), 20-5. W.Croft Dickinson, Scotland from the Earliest Times to 
1603 (Oxford 1959, revised by A.A.M. Duncan 1977), ch. 16. ‘Dark and Drublie Days’ depicts David as a 
somewhat hazy figure, a ‘devious king…[who] ruled circumspectly but efficiently…a very different man [to 
his father] but one no less determined that, whoever lost his patrimony, it should not be the Bruce’. 
14
 E.W.M. Balfour-Melville, Edward III and David II (Historical Association Pamphlet G. 27, 1954) and 
James I, King of Scots (London 1936), 2-3. 
15
 Barrow, Bruce, 413. 
 11 
by the stark contrast between ‘Good King Robert’, the victor of Bannockburn, and David, 
the weaker son who got what he deserved at Neville’s Cross. 
 However, a revisionist, more balanced view of David was at hand. Bruce Webster 
(1965) challenged the accepted picture of the king as a dilettante, unpatriotic monarch by 
playing up the apparent strengths of his later period of rule, 1357-71. These were so 
impressive, it was argued, as to make amends for David’s youthful failings and 
‘intermittent and rather fitful government’ before 1346. After 1357 David could be said to 
have been a king deeply interested in government, restoring parliaments, justice circuits 
or ‘ayres’ and exchequer audits after his absence. Webster argues that David made a 
‘deliberate effort to rule with circumspection and a wide measure of consent’, including 
the great magnates in his talks with England as well as favouring a wide number of lesser 
knights as his counsellors. This meant that ‘there was no collapse in David’s reign…the 
king was not overwhelmed by the power of his barons. Any collapse…came after 1371’. 
David clashed with Thomas Stewart, earl of Angus (1360-2), over the murder of the 
king’s mistress in 1360; with Thomas, earl of Mar, resulting in a successful royal siege of 
Kildrummy castle (1362) and that earl’s imprisonment (1369); and he faced down a major 
rebellion by the Stewarts and the earls of March and Douglas in 1363. But still, ‘[David] 
possessed what was more valuable than mere energy, an unusual political 
maturity…[and] seems from 1363 to have ruled at peace with most of his leading nobles. 
This must imply restraint and some statesmanship on both sides’.16 
 Ranald Nicholson soon went even further than this. In a highly entertaining 
article, ‘David II, the historians and the chroniclers’ (1966), he argued that David was a 
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far more capable, calculating and authoritative king than the late medieval Scottish 
chroniclers – most of whom assembled their material after the accession of Robert 
Steward as Robert II in 1371 – would have their readers believe. For Nicholson, the 
disastrous early years of David’s reign were clearly beyond his control; his defeat and 
capture at Neville’s Cross may have been the fault of a young, rash but nonetheless brave 
Bruce king. But from 1350 David’s entertainment of the possible recognition of an 
English royal as his heir presumptive was a shrewd gamble. It was worth making if it 
brought about his release and the avoidance of a crippling ransom, and if he besides could 
wipe the slate clean by producing his own Bruce son. After 1357, David continued his 
hard bargaining with England and proved himself well able to assert his authority over his 
baronial subjects.
17
 As Nicholson pointed out, the Orygynale chronicler, Andrew 
Wyntoun (c. 1355-1422), prior of St Serf’s priory of Loch Leven in Fife, certainly used a 
source written by a contemporary of David’s reign compiled c. 1390 which emphasised 
the king’s assertion of his stern personal authority – his so-called ‘raddure’, indeed, was 
such that ‘nane durst withstand his will’.18 
 These were themes developed further in Nicholson’s essential Scotland – The 
Later Middle Ages (1974) which stressed David’s reconstruction of the administration of 
Scottish kingship after its collapse under the Lieutenancy of Robert Steward, 1346-57. 
Effective justice ayres and regular extraordinary taxation granted by annual councils or 
parliaments – attended by the ‘tres communitates’, the three estates – amounted to a 
regime of ‘unexampled intensiveness’ in Scotland, founded on a ‘real civil service’. 
David’s personal hard-headedness and his sharp distribution of patronage to lesser Scots 
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with their own followings to win support enabled him to exert his will over troublesome 
provincial magnates: ‘royal patronage went to a nobility of service…almost all who held 
the rank of earl were cowed into submission’. Thus for Nicholson this was an impressive 
reign of ‘relative success’ and royal strength after 1357: ‘David with a few assets save his 
own astuteness and forceful personality made himself so completely the master of 
Scotland. Only in his second wife did he meet his match’!19 
 However, before David could attain an historical image as a confidently masterful 
monarch some perceptive words of caution were voiced. For Alexander Grant (1984), 
although David was a ‘tough and energetic’ king seemingly in ‘firm control of his 
kingdom’ at the time of his death, his was nevertheless ‘the kind of kingship that brought 
several English kings to grief’ – intrusive, disruptive and grasping, unacceptable to 
Scottish regional magnate sensibilities so long left to their own devices. Before the 
disaster at Neville’s Cross ‘David’s kingship had been distinctly partisan, a dangerous 
sign when coupled with the connections between central rivalries and local feuds’. After 
1357, David’s anxious pursuit of a peace deal with England and his repeated wilful 
interference in the lands of some of the great Scottish magnates provoked instances of 
‘temporary strictness’ enforced by the king against these nobles. The intermittent threat of 
rebellion and civil war was defused only by ‘the general reluctance throughout the 
political community to take disputes to extremes’, staying David’s hand on several 
occasions and limiting his powers of taxation.
20
 
 Michael Lynch’s stunning one-volume Scotland – A New History (1989) echoed 
this mixed review of David’s accomplishments. Here, this Bruce reign is portrayed neatly 
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as one of two distinct kingships, 1341-6 and 1357-71. In the first phase, however, David’s 
rule showed little maturity and in the second his reconstruction of royal government and 
finance was offset by his controversial relations with England and ‘signs less of 
troublesome magnates, than an inability on the part of an inexperienced king to keep a 
range of noble interests in balance’. David had to learn the hard way that he needed the 
consensus of his subjects in parliament to make policy and avoid rebellion: moreover, he 
‘failed to realise that some of his liaisons had serious political repurcussions…[at a time 
of] dangerous isolation for the royal house of Bruce’, but he died before any firm 
assessment of his achievements might reasonably be made.
21
 
 A.A.M. Duncan has also recently thrown badly-needed light on the mixed success 
of David’s complex diplomatic dealings with Edward III after 1346. In these time-
consuming talks David comes across as extremely capable and calculating amidst his own 
difficult personal circumstances and the wider quicksands of the first decades of what 
would be over a century of war in north-western Europe. His goals were rational, 
consistent and not unrealistic, especially in terms of the effect they might have had on the 
politics of Scotland. However, Duncan is convinced not only that the scale of opposition 
in Scotland to David’s allied diplomatic and domestic plans was much greater and more 
organised than has previously been recognised, but also that the king’s agenda was 
increasingly weakened after 1350 by his continued ‘self-deception’ in thinking that he 
could still sire a Bruce son of his own to offset any concessions he might make to Edward 
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III. The obvious conclusion to be drawn from this argument is that David was incapable 
of fatherhood, a deluded dynast.
22
 
 Conversely, the most recent historical work on fourteenth-century Scottish 
kingship has given David an almost ironically ‘fatherly’ image in highlighting his ability 
to attract and command the support of a wide, powerful circle of vigorous, well-
motivated lesser magnates, knights and esquires, as well as clerics and burgesses, to call 
upon in his diplomacy and his frequent intimidation of his greatest noble subjects. 
Stephen Boardman has written a groundbreaking study of the reigns of Robert II and his 
son, Robert III (1371-1406), both key subjects in David’s reign before their accession - as 
Robert the Steward and, before his name-change, John Stewart of Kyle, respectively. This 
research has shown that David used such patronage, centred around his professed interest 
in chivalry and the crusades, to win and reward support for the crown in clashes against 
the Stewarts and other magnates over vast, valuable provincial titles: David did so from 
the very beginning of his adult rule.
23
  
After 1346, moreover, David’s attempt to cut a succession-ransom deal with 
Edward III and his search for a Scottish bride capable of giving him a son were both 
bound up with his mounting desire to contain, really to break, the territorial and political 
influence and autonomy of the Stewarts and other great regional nobles. Carefully 
cultivated support allowed David to pursue domestic and foreign policies which were 
‘increasingly aggressive and independent’. Indeed he had been able to suppress the 
Stewart-led backlash against this agenda and achieve a strong position of authority and 
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the promise of royal supremacy in the future by the time he died in 1371. Michael Brown 
has similarly illuminated the parallel interaction between the intrusive and aggressive 
David II and the several scions of the house of Douglas, a contest in which by 1370-71, 
the king had undeniably succeeded in shifting the balance of power to favour the crown 
and its preferred followers.
24
 In these studies, then, David can be seen as a generous, 
charismatic benefactor to some but a deeply unpleasant, threatening enemy, almost a 
tyrant, to others. Such work has prompted Alexander Grant to offer a slightly modified 
view of Scotland post-1329, highlighting the essentially factional nature of crown-
magnate politics but pointing to a stalemate in which ‘compromising greatly outweighed 
the acts of violence’ until ‘high politics became a matter of life and death’ c. 1402.25   
Study of David’s personality and style of rule and the dramatic events and crown-
magnate relations of his reign has, therefore, clearly advanced considerably since the 
scholars of the nineteenth-century bemoaned a dearth of original sources from the period. 
But despite this work, there is arguably still no popular received view of this long reign in 
the public domain. More often than not David enters historical discussion simply as 
‘Robert Bruce’s son’. He then exits – along with four decades of fascinating Scottish 
politics – until mention of his death and the advent of the long-running Stewart dynasty in 
1371 and the generation of the next Scottish victory over England at Otterburn (1388): 
crucially, as we shall see, this was a period dominated by men anxious to censor the 
achievments and legacy of the last Bruce king. At best, David retains consequently only a 
vague image of limited success in a few areas overwhelmed by drastic failure in others. 
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The exact nature of his relations with England does not sit well with the traditions of the 
modern patriotic nation born on the field of Bannockburn: on the other hand, David’s 
dealings with England were arguably so ambivalent and potentially two-faced that he 
cannot be easily championed by present-day unionist commentators in Britain. Even 
much of the physical legacy of David’s reign has been obliterated over time: his tomb in 
Holyrood Abbey vandalised in the late seventeenth-century and his bones scattered; his 
devotional church at St Monans in Fife partly absorbed by later work; his square Tower 
House at Edinburgh castle destroyed in an English bombardment in 1573 and over-built. 
Thus in the most recent one-volume analysis of the nation’s past, David’s was still 
understandably ‘one of the most anonymous reigns in Scottish history’: even in 2002 this 





 Arguably, he deserves better. David’s reign saw Scotland not only through the 
first decades of the Hundred Years War but also the most virulent period of the Black 
Death (c. 1349) with all the suffering and social, economic and political upheaval and 
change these Europe-wide experiences heralded. But more importantly, as the most recent 
research has suggested, David’s reign – and the period of the Bruce dynasty as a whole – 
proved the key formative years of the late medieval Scottish kingdom’s politics and 
collective indentity.  
Out of the Wars of Independence a recast Scottish monarchy, nobility and 
community emerged, with a conflicting variety of both traditional and new expectations 
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for the future. It was during both the years of David’s long absences and his personal 
monarchy that the balance of power between the at-once complementary and competing 
interests of crown and three estates in Scotland was first worked, and often fought, out. A 
detailed picture of David, his inheritance and his kingship is necessary to bridge the gulf 
between the established view of the massive achievements by 1329 of Robert I, his 
warrior lieutenants and patriotic churchmen on the one hand, and, on the other, the 
immense difficulties of the new Stewart monarchy after 1371, its authority often 
dangerously eclipsed by the demands of its princes and regional magnates.  
More specifically, a number of questions about David’s personality and policies, 
and the events of his long reign, remain unanswered. David would develop a unique style 
of personal lordship and royal household, court and government to suit the trying 
circumstances at home and abroad which he inherited from the period 1306 to 1341, and 
those which he encountered and created for himself thereafter. But just what was the 
influence of the legacy he inherited from his father? Why did David fall into conflict so 
quickly with Robert Steward and other great Scottish magnates whose families had 
gratefully supported Robert I and fought hard in the 1330s? Were David’s ideas about 
closer relations with England after 1346 completely abhorent to his subjects after two 
generations of warfare against the Plantagenets? Did David’s style of kingship amount to 
the kind of authoritarian model which he himself must have observed in Edward III’s 
rule? In this sense was it also a model of hard-headed rule which the fifteenth-century 
Stewart kings of Scotland would look to as a template to assert over their subjects, all too 
often with violent consequences and necessary bloodletting? Or were David’s personal 
failings and problems – most obviously with the succession and Anglo-Scottish relations 
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– such that he never really convinces as Nicholson’s masterful king of Scots? These 
issues, and others, form the main themes of this book.  
